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Abstract: Ecstatic epilepsy is a rare form of focal epilepsy in which the aura (beginning of the seizures)
consists of a blissful state of mental clarity/feeling of certainty. Such a state has also been described
as a “religious” or mystical experience. While this form of epilepsy has long been recognized as
a temporal lobe epilepsy, we have accumulated evidence converging toward the location of the
symptomatogenic zone in the dorsal anterior insula during the 10 last years. The neurocognitive
hypothesis for the genesis of a mental clarity is the suppression of the interoceptive prediction errors
and of the unexpected surprise associated with any incoming internal or external signal, usually
processed by the dorsal anterior insula. This mimics a perfect prediction of the world and induces a
feeling of certainty. The ecstatic epilepsy is thus an amazing model for the role of anterior insula in
uncertainty and surprise.
Keywords: ecstatic epilepsy; ecstatic aura; anterior insula; mental clarity; certainty; predictive coding;
active inference; interoception
1. Introduction
Epilepsies are brain diseases of various etiology characterized by abnormal electric
activities in brain networks. Epilepsy has always provided a unique opportunity to get
a better understanding of cortical functions and, more particularly, of complex cognitive
functions. In particular, the use of intracranial electrode investigations (recording and
stimulation) for presurgical purpose has led to a better knowledge of the pathological
phenomena but also of the cerebral functioning. For instance, a large variety of studies
about the epileptic symptoms of “déjà vu” and of “reminiscence of memory”, including the
“Proust phenomenon”, have helped to understand the different roles of the mesial temporal
lobe regions in memory [1–4]. Ecstatic epilepsy is another example of a phenomenon
of epileptic origin which helps to disentangle the neural correlates of specific cognitive
states [5,6]. The ecstatic epileptic aura mimics experiences which have been described for
centuries and have fascinated philosophers, psychologists, and theologians, among other
people. These experiences sometimes are referred to, and described as, “mystical experi-
ences”. Thus, ecstatic epilepsy brings a tremendous opportunity to study the neuronal
correlates of this specific state of consciousness.
As a reminder, an epileptic seizure is a dynamic process. In focal epilepsies (as
opposed to generalized epilepsies), the epileptic discharge starts in one region of one
hemisphere and may progressively spread across the brain, with visible evolution of the
clinical symptoms within a few seconds to a few minutes. An epileptic aura may inaugurate
the seizure, in the form of symptoms which are only experienced by the patient and are
not discernible to the people around. After the aura, the seizure can evolve into a loss of
contact and, in some cases, into convulsions.
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Ecstatic epilepsy is a rare form of focal epilepsy in which the aura consists of a blissful
state, experienced as a vivid feeling of lucidity and plenitude. The first detailed description
of ecstatic seizures dates from Dostoevsky in the 19th century [7]. He described them in
his letters to friends and used the descriptions of his own seizures for characters of his
novels, such as Prince Mychkine in the novel The Idiot. Around 50 cases of patients with
ecstatic epilepsy have been described in the literature, mostly as reports of single cases [8].
However, this form of focal epilepsy is very likely under-estimated because people are
often reluctant to speak about the ecstatic symptoms. They find it difficult to find the right
words to express what they experienced, and they fear being taken for mentally deranged.
2. Similarities of the Ecstatic Aura with the Mystical Experience
A thorough interview of all the epileptic patients treated at the University Hospitals
of Geneva and the University Hospital of Marseille, led to a precise description of the
symptoms felt during the focal seizures. The interviews led to identification of about
20 cases with ecstatic epilepsy within the last 10 years. Clear common features of ecstatic
auras emerged: a sense of physical well-being, a feeling of heightened self-awareness
(constant) and heightened vividness of the environment (inconstant) with descriptions of a
sensation of mental clarity, sometimes called enlightenment, ultimate reality, revelation,
knowledge, or certainty. This sensation of mental clarity was the main finding, reported in
all cases. Some patients reported, additionally, a sense of unity with the environment. The
experience was associated with an intense positive affect in nearly all patients, even if some
feared that the ecstatic experience would possibly evolve into a convulsive (tonic–clonic)
seizure after having lived it.
- The American psychophysiologist and philosopher William James had a great interest in similar
experiences that he called “religious” or which are called “mystical” [9]. For him, the genuine
“mystical experience” provides a pointer to a reality that is more likely true than the one we
usually live (“insight into depths of truth”). According to him, a mystical experience is defined
by four features:
- Ineffability in the way “the experience defies expression”
- A noetic quality which is a state of knowledge, or “insight into depths of truth”, unaffected by




3. Arguments for the Role of the Insula in the Ecstatic Experience
Looking to identify a brain region that could be the source of this range of symptoms,
namely, physical well-being, heightened self-awareness, and intense positive affect, around
12 years ago we explored the anterior insula [5]. According to Craig [10], within the
insula there is a posterior-to -anterior processing of interoceptive signals, coming from the
inside the body and contextualized by external signals. Interoceptive signals are processed
with additional cognitive information arriving to the insula, and result, in the anterior
insula, in a representation in the form of subjective feelings. One neuroimaging study was
particularly convincing in demonstrating this gradient within the insula, from a posterior
physical representation of an (external) signal of cold on the hand to an anterior emotional
integration [11]: the activity (blood flow) in the posterior insula correlated with the objective
intensity of the cold temperature, while the activity in the anterior insula correlated with
the subjective appreciation (feeling) of the temperature intensity.
Support for the hypothesis that the anterior insula plays a crucial role in the ecstatic
symptoms came through nuclear imaging studies in a few patients with ecstatic epilepsy.
In one patient who already had a surgery with a temporal lobe resection, a single-photon-
emission computed tomography (SPECT) using technetium-99m ethyl cysteinate dimer
(99mTc-ECD) during an ecstatic seizure showed an increased blood flow in the anterior
insula [5]. In a second patient, an increased blood flow also appeared in the dorsal part
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of the anterior/mid-insula, when performing the subtraction between a SPECT during
a seizure and a SPECT outside a seizure (Figure 1) [6]. Even more convincing evidence
in favor of anterior insula as the source of the ecstatic experience came in a study of
a patient from Marseille in France [12]. She had an ecstatic epilepsy which was drug-
resistant. After surface EEG evaluation, she had a pre-surgical evaluation of her epilepsy,
with intracerebral electrodes (stereo-electroencephalography, SEEG) implanted within the
right temporal lobe and insular cortex. A spontaneous recorded seizure involved first the
right mesiotemporal region and then showed a propagation in less than 1 s in the dorsal
anterior insula, concomitant with the ecstatic symptoms. Importantly, the stimulation of
the electrode within the dorsal part of the anterior insula at 50 Hz during 3 s induced the
ecstatic aura in a reproducible way. There was no post-stimulation discharge, supporting
the fact that the symptoms were related to that insular region only. Stimulation of the
mesiotemporal region or of other regions did not induce the ecstatic aura.
Brain Sci. 2021, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 8 
 
emission computed tomography (SPECT) using technetium-99m ethyl cysteinate dimer 
(99mTc-ECD) during an ecstatic seizure showed an increased blood flow in the anterior 
insula [5]. In a second patient, an increased blood flow also appeared in the dorsal part of 
the anterior/mid-insula, when performing the subtraction between a SPECT during a sei-
zure and  SPECT outside a seizur  (Figure 1) [6]. Even more convin ing evidence in favor 
of ante i r insula as the source of the ecstatic exp rience cam  in a study of a p tient from 
Mars ille in France [12]. She h d an ecstatic pilepsy which was drug-resistant. After sur-
face EEG evaluation, she had a pre-surgical evaluation of her epilepsy, with intracerebral 
electrodes (stereo-electroencephalography, SEEG) implanted within the right temporal 
lobe and insular cortex. A spontaneous recorded seizure involved first the right mesiotem-
poral region and then showed a propagation in less than 1 s in the dorsal anterior insula, 
concomitant with the ecstatic symptoms. Importantly, the stimulation of the electrode 
within the dorsal part of the anterior insula at 50 Hz during 3 s induced the ecstatic aura 
in a reproducible way. There was no post-stimulation discharge, supporting the fact that 
the symptoms were related to that insular region only. Stimulation of the mesiotemporal 
region or of other regions did not induce the ecstatic aura. 
 
Figure 1. Cerebral MRI (sagittal view) and ictal/interictal technetium-99m HMPAO (99mTc-
HMPAO) SPECT subtraction using BRASS analysis program in a patient with ecstatic epilepsy. It 
shows an increased blood flow maximal at the junction of the right dorsal mid-insula and central 
operculum. Adapted from a Figure published in Cortex 49 (2013), F. Picard, State of belief, subjective 
certainty, and bliss as a product of cortical dysfunction, page 2495, Reproduced with permission 
from Elsevier. 
Subsequently, ecstatic auras could be reproduced in two other patients suffering also 
from an ecstatic epilepsy in Marseille, through the electrical stimulation of the dorsal part 
of the anterior insula (Figure 2) on the left side for one patient and on the right side for the 
other one (with 5-s stimulation at 50 Hz, pulse width 1 ms, see Figure 3) [13]. Functional 
connectivity analysis on SEEG signals pooled from the three cases was applied to study 
the interactions between brain regions during these stimulations. A measure of directed 
connectivity (out-degrees) showed that the insula was the leading structure in the period 
following the stimulations and coinciding with the emergence of ecstatic symptoms. Ac-
cording to personal communications, ecstatic auras have since been reproduced in several 
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Figure 1. Cerebral MRI (sagittal view) and ictal/interictal technetium-99m HMPAO (99mTc-HMPAO)
SPECT subtraction using BRASS analysis program in a patient with ecstatic epilepsy. It shows an
increased blood flow maximal at the junction of the right dorsal mid-insula and central operculum.
Adapted from a Figure published in Cortex 49 (2013), F. Picard, State of belief, subjective certainty,
and bliss as a product of cortical dysfunction, page 2495, Reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
Subsequently, ecstatic auras could be reproduced in two other patients suffering also
from an ecstatic epilepsy in Marseille, through the electrical stimulation of the dorsal
part of the anterior insula (Figure 2) on the left side for one patient and on the right side
for the other one (with 5-s stimulation at 50 Hz, pulse width 1 ms, see Figure 3) [13].
Functional connectivity analysis on SEEG signals pooled from the three cases was applied
to study the interactions between brain regions during these stimulations. A measure of
directed connectivity (out-degrees) showed that the insula was the leading structure in the
period following the stimulations and coinciding with the emergence of ecstatic symptoms.
According to personal communications, ecstatic auras have since been reproduced in
several other patients through the stimulation of the insula.
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Brain Sci. 2021, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 8 
 
 
Figure 2. Localization of the contacts inducing an ecstatic aura in the operculo-insular region in three patients, in yellow. 
Adapted from a Figure published in Brain Stimulation 12(5) (2019), F. Bartolomei, S. Lagarde, D. Scavarda, R. Carron, C.G. 
Bénar, and F. Picard, The role of the dorsal anterior insula in ecstatic sensation revealed by direct electrical brain stimula-
tion, page 1123, Reproduced with permission from Elsevier. 
 
Figure 3. Stereo-electroencephalography (SEEG) recording during a stimulation inducing an ecstatic aura, in Patient 3, 
showing the detail of seven bipolar channels. The figure shows the SEEG signals and the artifact of electrical stimulation 
applied in the insula (50 Hz, 1 ms pulse width, 1.6 mA) for 5 s. There is no visible after-discharge. Each line represents a 
bipolar lead representative of a brain region: TP1–2: temporal pole; A1–2: amygdala; A9–10: middle temporal gyrus; 0R1–
2: orbitofrontal cortex; OR 10–11: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PM9–10: premotor cortex; and OF4–5: anterior insula. 
Adapted from a Figure published in Brain Stimulation 12(5) (2019), F. Bartolomei, S. Lagarde, D. Scavarda, R. Carron, C.G. 
Bénar, and F. Picard. The role of the dorsal anterior insula in ecstatic sensation revealed by direct electrical brain stimula-
tion, page 1123, Reproduced with permission from Elsevier. 
Nevertheless, in all cases, patients had already suffered from ecstatic epilepsy. There-
fore, one cannot exclude the possibility that insular network had been altered through 
Patient 1 Patient 3 Patient 2 
Figure 2. Localization of the contacts inducing an ecstatic aura in the operculo-insular region in three patients, in yellow.
Adapted from a Figure published in Brain Stimulation 12(5) (2019), F. Bartolomei, S. Lagarde, D. Scavarda, R. Carron, C.G.
Bénar, and F. Picard, The role of the dorsal anterior insula in ecstatic sensation revealed by direct electrical brain stimulation,
page 1123, Reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
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Figure 3. Stereo-electroencephalography (SEEG) recording during a stimulation inducing an ecstatic aura, in Patient 3,
showing the detail of seven bipolar channels. The figure shows the SEEG signals and the artifact of electrical stimulation
applied in the insula (50 Hz, 1 ms pulse width, 1.6 mA) for 5 s. There is no visible after-discharge. Each line represents
a bipolar lead representative of a brain region: TP1–2: temporal pole; A1–2: amygdala; A9–10: middle temporal gyrus;
0R1–2: orbitofrontal cortex; OR 10–11: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PM9–10: premotor cortex; and OF4–5: anterior insula.
dapted fro a Figure published in Brain Sti ulation 12(5) (2019), F. Bartolo ei, S. Lagarde, . Scavarda, R. Carron, C. .
r, and F. Picard. The role of the dorsal anterior insula in ecstatic sensation rev al d by direct lectri al brain stimulation,
page 1123, Reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
e ert eless, i all cases, atie ts a alrea s ffere fr ecstatic e ile s . ere-
fore, one cann t exclu e the possibility that insular net ork ha been altere through
repeated prior epileptic discharges, favoring appearance of the ecstatic phenomenon at
the time of the stimulation of the dorsal nterior ins la. Conclusive ev d nce for a crucial
role for anterior insula did not emerge un il recently, when we manag d to induce ecstatic
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experience by electrical stimulation of the dorsal part of the anterior insula in a patient who
suffered from a temporal lobe epilepsy with non-ecstatic auras (manuscript under review).
4. Neurocognitive Hypothesis
The study of the neurobiological foundations of decision-making has led to the de-
velopment of the theory of predictive coding [14,15]. According to this theory, the brain
functions as a predictive machine. This means that it acts primarily through predictions. It
does not wait for stimuli from the outside world or the bodily reactions to those stimuli.
The predictions are referred to as “top–down signals” [16]. A “reference model” generates
the predictions. The model builds on past experience and may be partly innate [15]. When
external or interoceptive stimuli actually do arrive, the resulting “bottom–up” signals
arriving in the brain are compared to the top–down ones. Any mismatch produces a
prediction error. If the magnitude of the prediction error is large, the reference model is
updated, to make it more successful in future forecasts and, hence, to make future actions
more effective. Thus, surprise, which corresponds to the magnitude of the prediction error
causes revisions of the reference model, to ensure that it better reflects reality.
In more recent versions of the theory of predictive coding [17–19], the opposite hap-
pens as well: in the case of surprise, the decision-maker (“agent”) attempts to bring reality
in line with the reference model. The agent actively searches for environments that better
reflect the reference model. In other words, the agent attempts to alter the environment
so as to experience less surprise. The agent searches for better control of uncertainty. This
“active inference” enriches learning paradigms. For indeed, there are two ways to enhance
predictive coding: one is to improve the reference model; the second one is to interfere
with the environment and to prepare emotionally for this interference, with the purpose of
making the reference model predict better (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Proposed Insula Function (in black). Insula receives interoceptive bottom–up signals as
well as top–down predictive signals. The latter emerge as the output of a “reference model” that
forecasts interoceptive signals. Anterior insula compares the bottom–up and top–down signals and
produces a surprise signal when the discrepancy is larger than expected. Upon surprise, the decision-
maker is made aware of the need to learn and adapt. This involves updating the reference model
(black arrow pointing up), actively interfering in the environment (black arrow pointing to right)
and emotional prepar tion fo future chang s in the environment (black arrow pointing down).
Some time later, the environment (green) produces new stimuli, which in turn affect interoceptive
signals. The resulting bottom–up signals are again compared to (top–down) predictions from the
updated reference model. If the size of prediction errors is as expected, there is no more surprise, and
no more learning and adaptation.
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Active inference makes novel implications. Most importantly, as long as surprise is
acceptable, actions are maintained. When surprise increases, the need to adapt emerges.
Learning and adaptation thus emerge only after excessive surprise. We believe that behav-
ior is not guided by an urge to optimize, i.e., to become the best possible, even if, under
certain circumstances, optimality can be generated [20]. This is in contrast to standard
theories, such as in Q Learning on which machine learning is built [21]. In Q learning,
prediction errors are used solely to improve the reference model, until it becomes optimal.
That is, mistakes are used exclusively to update the reference model until it makes the best
possible forecasts.
In opposition to Q learning, in real life, learning and adaptation stop when an accept-
able level of uncertainty (not too high) is reached. This is consistent with active inference,
where the agent does not optimize, but “satisfices” (to use a term originally suggested
in [22]). A satisficing agent stops adapting when reaching a “bliss point,” which emerges
when interaction with the environment generates uncertainty that is in line with the agent’s
reference model. If the agent cannot act upon its environment in a way that generates
the desired amount of uncertainty (i.e., not too high) and if the agent fails to draw the
right conclusions—which is that the reference model has to be adapted—then frustration
ensues. As such, active inference theories may shed new light on anxiety and depression
disorders. Among others, people who exhibit less tolerance for uncertainty should be more
susceptible to anxiety and depression [23].
As to interoception, i.e., the perception of the physiological state of the body, the
comparison between predictions and real incoming signals has been shown to take place
within the insula [24]. The insula also tracks the magnitude of these prediction errors, that
is, the insula tracks the surprise. The interoceptive experience, as well as the resulting
emotions, can be thought of as the result of the surprise signals rather than of the incoming
interoceptive signals themselves [24,25].
Evidence has been mounting over the last two decades that the dorsal anterior insula
plays a crucial role in tracking surprise and uncertainty, in the form of a signal that
compares how far outcomes are from predictions. This role emerges in a variety of settings,
from complex social situations [19,20] down to simple probabilistic [21,22] and perceptual
tasks [23]. Besides these functional MRI studies linking surprise and the anterior insula,
there are human pathologies which also support this association. E.g., anxiety proneness
correlates with increased dorsal anterior insula activity [26]; intolerance to uncertainty is
associated with increased anterior insular reactivity [27], while intolerance to uncertainty
is more acute in anxiety disorders [28].
During an ecstatic seizure, we have demonstrated that there is an epileptic discharge
within the anterior insula [12]. Our hypothesis as to the resulting ecstatic experience is
based on the role of the anterior insula as comparator between predictions and outcomes,
particularly in the field of interoception [6]. We here extend this hypothesis to electrical
stimulation of the anterior insula. Electrical stimulation induces an increase in synchrony of
neuronal firing. The increased synchrony could prevent anterior insula from reaching the
minimal level of differentiation necessary to process the mismatch between interoceptive
signals and their predictions and, hence, prevent the anterior insula from generating
surprise. Consequently, the patient reaches a bliss point; s/he experiences an unusual
and hard-to-articulate sensation, of being in control of, or of completely understanding,
his/her environment.
5. Conclusions
The ecstatic epilepsy is being revealed here as an amazing model for the role of the
anterior insula in building awareness of uncertainty and surprise. It has the potential to
elucidate the role of surprise in driving adaptation and control, and ultimately the level
of physical and mental well-being. Future work could exploit the ability to create ecstatic
symptoms to decipher the causal effect of disruption of neural firing in the dorsal anterior
insula on feelings and behavior.
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There is still a need to understand why only a subset of subjects experienced an ecstatic
phenomenon as the result of an epileptic discharge in, or of electrical stimulation of, the
dorsal anterior insula. Potential explanations include differences in brain connectivity or
differences in the autonomic nervous system, but one cannot exclude that discharge or
stimulation may be insufficient to have an impact on feelings.
Induced ecstatic auras could provide a unique opportunity to understand the role of
surprise in generating anxiety-related symptoms of some neuropsychiatric disorders. Abil-
ity to induce feelings of “bliss” through stimulation in patients suffering from depression
may provide a path towards novel therapies, to temporarily alleviate symptoms, and, in
the long run, to cure them.
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